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Bottlenecks, Modules and Dynamic Architectural Capabilities 
Carliss Y. Baldwin 
Abstract 
Architectural  capabilities  are  an  important  subset  of  dynamic  capabilities  that 
provide managers with the ability to see a complex technical system in an abstract way 
and change the system’s structure by rearranging its components. In this paper, I argue 
that the essence of dynamic architectural capabilities lies in the effective management of 
bottlenecks  and  modules  in  conjunction  with  organizational  boundaries  and  property 
rights in a technical system. Bottlenecks are points of value creation and capture in any 
complex man-made system. The tools a firm can use to manage bottlenecks are, first, an 
understanding  of  the  modular  structure  of  the  technical  system;  and,  second,  an 
understanding  of  the  contract  structure  of  the  firm,  especially  its  organizational 
boundaries  and  property  rights.  Although  these  tools  involve  disparate  bodies  of 
knowledge, they must be used in tandem to achieve maximum effect. 
 
Keywords:  architecture,  architectural  knowledge,  dynamic  capabilities,  bottleneck, 
modularity, organization design, organization boundaries, property rights.  
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Bottlenecks, Modules and Dynamic Architectural Capabilities 
Carliss Y. Baldwin 
1 Introduction 
Architectural  capabilities  are  an  important  subset  of  dynamic  capabilities  that 
provide managers with the ability to see a complex technical system in an abstract way 
and change the system’s structure by rearranging its components. Purposeful architectural 
change can then be used to create and capture value at different points in the technical 
system. In this paper I argue that value-enhancing architectural change arises through the 
effective  management  of  bottlenecks  and  modules  in  conjunction  with  the  firm’s 
organizational boundaries and property rights.  
The concept of an “architecture” for man-made systems dates back to Herbert 
Simon. In the classic paper  “The Architecture of Complexity,” Simon proposed a theory 
of the structure of complex systems based on the concepts of hierarchy and modularity.
1 
(Simon, 1962; 1981). The term later entered the management literature when Henderson 
and  Clark  (1990)  introduced  the  dual  concepts  of  “architectural  innovation,”    and 
“modular innovation,” defined respectively as a change the way the components of a 
product  are  linked  together  and  a  change  in  the  interior  structure  of  a  component. 
Subsequent  definitions  have  been  put  forward  by  Ulrich  (1995);  Blaauw  and  Brooks 
(1997);  Baldwin and Clark (2000); Whitney et. al. (2004); Fixson (2005);  and Arthur 
(2009).  
                                                 
1 Simon used the term “near-decomposability” instead of modularity. Both concepts refer to an abstract 
pattern of linkages between components that can be arranged as a (nearly) block diagonal matrix. See 
Simon (1981, p. 212); Augier and Simon (2003); and Baldwin and Clark (2000, pp. 63-76). BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Drawing on these works, I define the  architecture of a technical system as an 
abstract description that specifies (1) the system’s functions and how it creates value for 
users;  (2)  the  components  of  the  system  and  how  they  contribute  to  the  system’s 
performance; and (3) the specific linkages and interfaces between the components. In 
brief, the architecture of a system defines its components, describes interfaces between 
components,  and  specifies  ways  of  testing  performance.    All  man-made  systems, 
including all products and organizations, have architectures. 
In a designed system, a complete architecture includes descriptions of the design 
structure and the task structure. The design structure describes design elements and how 
they are related. Pictures, blueprints, and diagrams are ways of capturing design structure. 
The task structure describes the procedures that must be carried out to turn the the design 
into a real thing. Recipes, procedures and computer programs are ways of capturing the 
task  structure.  The  design  structure  and  the  task  structure  correspond  to  what  Simon 
called the “state description” and the “process description” of a complex system.   “The 
former characterize the world as sensed; they provide the criteria for identifying objects 
…  .    The  latter  characterize  the  world  as  acted  upon;  they  provide  the  means  for 
producing or generating objects having the desired characteristics” (Simon, 1981, p. 222).  
Many man-made systems are not entirely planned or designed. Such systems have 
architectures in the sense of “abstract descriptions,” but some features of the system are 
not  the  result  of  planned  actions:  instead  they  arise  out  of  chance,  history,  mistaken 
beliefs, and serendipity. For example, cities, legal systems, and corporations all have both 
designed  and  undesigned  features  (Alexander,  1964;  Arthur,  2009).  In  organization 
theory,  these  roughly  correspond  to  the  “formal”  and  “informal”  aspects  of  the BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
    3 
organization  (Scott,  1987;  Nadler  and  Tushman,  1997;  Baker,  Gibbons  and  Murphy, 
1999; Gibbons, 2003; Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). 
Engineers and product designers are concerned with the material structure of a 
product or process and the technical tasks needed to produce the product or carry out the 
process. Their focus is on the technical architecture of the system. However, to bring the 
components together and carry out the tasks specified by the technical architecture, a 
social structure must be overlaid upon the task structure. Resources must be brought in, 
people  recruited, tasks  assigned,  products  transported  and  sold,  and  money  collected. 
These actions take place in the social domain, mediated by organizations and markets.  
As distinct from the technical architecture of a given product, Baldwin and Clark 
(2000) define the contract structure of an organization to include a description of its 
internal departments, compensation practices, boundaries, property rights, contracts, and 
transactions. Contract structures are part of the general architecture of a technical system: 
they  are  needed  to  assemble  the  resources  needed  to  carry  out  the  tasks  in  the  task 
structure. But technical architectures and contract structures involve different types of 
expertise and are usually handled by different individuals. For example, in movies and 
theatre, the contract structure is created by producers, while the task structure is created 
by writers and directors. In business, the contract structure is in the hands of managers, 
while the task structure is often in the hands of product designers, software developers 
and engineers. 
Several authors have now begun to use the term industry architecture to refer to 
the  aggregation  of  contract  structures  for  firms  in  a  particular  industry  (Jacobides, 
Knudsen and Augier, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007). This is also a convenient concept. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
    4 
In what follows, I use the term “contract structure” to refer to the social architecture of a 
single firm and “industry architecture” to refer to the collection of contract structures in a 
given industry. 
As  different  parts  of  the  general  architecture  of  complex,  man-made  systems, 
technical architectures, contract structures and industry architectures are related, but not 
in a deterministic way. As indicated, contract structures and industry architectures are set 
up to carry out the tasks specified by a given technical architecture. Those tasks in turn 
may be related in different ways:  for example, they may be tightly or loosely coupled 
(Weick,  1969;  Orton  and  Weick,  1990);  or  exhibit  different  forms  of  dependency 
(Thompson, 1967; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin, 2008). They may be carried out by 
a close-knit team within a single firm, by people in different departments of a firm, or by 
people in different firms. Sometimes the technical recipe is sensitive to these aspects of 
organizational design, while at other times, a given recipe can be implemented equally 
well by many different forms of organization. 
Although the mapping of technical architecture to contract structure is not one-to-
one, changes in the technical architecture of a system often beget changes in contract 
structure.  For  example,  taking  advantage  of  a  new  product  design  (a  new  technical 
architecture) may entail setting up a new business unit to make and sell the product (a 
new contract structure). Conversely, changes in contract structure often result in changes 
to the underlying technical architecture. For example, spinning off a product division 
directly changes to the contract structure of both the parent and daughter corporations. 
But,  given  independence  from  the  parent,  the  daughter  corporation  may  see  fit  to 
eliminate some products and introduce others, thereby changing its technical architecture. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Henderson and Clark (1990) define architectural knowledge as knowledge about 
the  functions  and  components  of  a  technical  system.  However,  because  technical 
architectures  and  contract  structures  are  related  (though  not  in  a  simple  way), 
architectural knowledge extends beyond knowledge of technology alone. A firm seeking 
competitive  advantage  through  architectural  change  must  have  managers  with  a 
sophisticated understanding of both technical and industry architectures, how they are 
related, and how they can be modified.  
In this paper, I argue that the essence of dynamic architectural capabilities lies in 
the effective management of bottlenecks and modules, in conjunction with organizational 
boundaries and property rights in a technical system. Bottlenecks are points of value 
creation and capture in any complex man-made system. They arise first as important 
technical problems to be solved. Once the problem is solved, the solution can be a means 
of capturing a stream of rents. The tools a firm can use to manage bottlenecks are, first, 
an understanding of the modular structure of the technical system and how it can be 
changed; and, second, an understanding of the contract structure of the firm, especially its 
organizational  boundaries  and  property  rights.  Although  these  tools  involve  disparate 
bodies of knowledge, they must be used in tandem to achieve maximum effect. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I define two 
types of bottlenecks, technical and strategic. I go on to show how bottlenecks are related 
to the modular structure of a technical system and the organizational boundaries and 
property rights of a particular firm. Section 3 deals with the management of technical 
bottlenecks.  Here  the  most  basic  question  is  whether  to  solve  a  particular  technical 
bottleneck by focusing on only a few components (a so-called “small footprint” strategy) BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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or by controlling many components (a “large footprint” strategy). Section 4 discusses 
how to protect strategic bottlenecks from imitation or substitution by the firm’s rivals. 
Section 5 describes how firms acquire architectural knowledge and capabilities. Section 6 
concludes by summarizing the basic arguments and pointing to as-yet-unresolved issues. 
2 Bottlenecks Defined 
Bottlenecks  are  key  to  understanding  the  direction  and  pace  of  technological 
change and are also critical to capturing value in large, complex technical systems. Firms 
and individuals seeking to create value through technological progress are advised to 
look for and resolve the technology’s bottlenecks (Rosenberg 1967, 1972; Hughes
2 1987; 
Langlois  and  Robertson,  1992;  Ethiraj  2007;  Arthur  2009;  Adner  and  Kapoor  2010, 
2014).  Firms  wishing  to  capture  value  are  advised  to  control  bottlenecks,  become  a 
bottleneck, and beware of bottlenecks controlled by others (Teece,1986; Langlois, 2002, 
2007; Jacobides, et. al., 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007; Jacobides, MacDuffie and Tae, 
2012; Jacobides and Tae, 2014; Henkel and Hoffmann, 2014).  
But what is a bottleneck?   
In common usage, a bottleneck is a narrow place that obstructs a flow (of water or 
traffic, for example). For example, in a road system, if all routes pass through a single 
stretch (say, a bridge or a mountain pass), and that part of the system is a source of 
congestion,  then  that  component  of  the  system  is  a  bottleneck.  More  generally,  a 
bottleneck is a component in a complex system whose performance significantly limits 
the performance of the system as a whole.  
                                                 
2 Hughes  (1983)  uses  the  quasi-military  term  “reverse  salient”  to  mean  something  very  similar  to 
“bottleneck.”  BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Consistent with common usage, in what follows, I define a bottleneck as a critical 
part of a technical system that has no — or very poor — alternatives at the present time. 
There may be one or many bottlenecks in a given system but each has the dual properties 
that (1) it is necessary to the functioning of the whole; and (2) there is no good way 
around  it.  Thus  to  know  that  something  is  a  bottleneck,  the  observer  must  see  it  in 
relation to a larger system, know what constitutes good system-level performance, and 
understand how the bottleneck constricts that performance.  
In  business,  there  are  two  types  of  bottlenecks,  technical  and  strategic.  In  a 
technical bottleneck, the hindrance to performance derives from physical properties of the 
system. For example, in a railroad system, if there is no bridge over a river and goods 
must be taken onto barges and reloaded on the other side, then the river constitutes a 
technical bottleneck. It impedes the performance of the whole system and there is no 
good way around it. Building a bridge can solve the problem of technical performance, 
but the owner of the bridge can charge a toll. The bridge plus the ability to control access 
to it then constitutes a strategic bottleneck. The former system of boats and barges is far 
less efficient, hence travellers and shippers have no good alternative except to use the 
bridge and pay the toll. 
Technical Bottlenecks 
Technical bottlenecks are defined by the way components interact to create value 
for users. A complex system is made up of conceptually separable components, each of 
which “does something” to contribute to the overall performance of the system (Arthur, 
2009). The components of the system, taken together, are jointly complementary: the BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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value of the system as a whole is greater than the value of the components disassembled 
(otherwise there would be no point in building the system).  
There  are  three  basic  origins  of  technical  bottlenecks  in  complex,  man-made 
systems. First, some necessary components of the minimally functional system may not 
exist at all. Let us call this a sine qua non bottleneck. Second, in systems involving flows, 
the capacity of the system will be constrained by the components with the least capacity 
relative to their frequency of use.  Call this a flow bottleneck. Third, in systems requiring 
parts  that  match  or  fit  together,  the  performance  of  the  system  as  a  whole  will  be 
constrained by the weakest or coarsest components. Call this a matching bottleneck. The 
next few paragraphs elaborate on these definitions. 
Sine qua non bottlenecks. A complex technical system can generally be broken 
down into parts, each of which is necessary to the performance of the whole. For example, 
a  digital  computer  at  a  minimum  must  have  components  that  perform  arithmetic 
computations; control the flow of instructions; store instructions and computations in 
memory; input instructions and data; and report results. Without all of these components, 
the computer cannot perform its basic function, thus each is sine qua non for the system. 
Similarly, an airplane at a minimum must have components to provide lift (the wings); 
thrust  (the  engines);  a  central  framework  (the  fuselage);  lateral  and  vertical  stability 
(elevators, ailerons, rudder); a steering mechanism (same); and the ability to land (flaps, 
wheels). If one of these parts is missing, the flying machine cannot function in a useful 
way. Again each is sine qua non for the system. 
Arthur  (2009)  describes  the  invention  of  novel  technologies  as  a  process  of 
linking solutions “until each problem and subproblem resolves itself into one that can be BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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physically dealth with—until the chain is fully in place” (p.110). The unsolved problems 
Arthur refers to are the sine qua non bottlenecks standing in the way of the creation of a 
new  technical  device.  When  the  last  or  most  difficult  subproblem  is  solved,  this  is 
generally recognized as a breakthough, and the event becomes part of the lore of the 
technology. For example, the Wright brothers solved the critical subproblem of lateral 
control of a flying machine (as well as other subproblems involving wing, propeller and 
engine design), and are credited with the invention of the first successful airplane. Arthur 
describes  several  other  breakthroughs,  including  Ernst  Lawrence’s  idea  to  use  timed 
voltages to accelerate particles in a circular tube (the cyclotron) and Gary Starkweather’s 
approach to the problems of modulation and pointing in laser printing (ibid., pp 114-119). 
Flow  bottlenecks.  Many  complex  systems  involve  flows.  The  flows  may  be 
trains through a railway system, goods through a factory,  electrons through a computer, 
instructions through a software program, messages through a communication network, 
transactions through a payments system, customers through a store, patients through a 
health care system, laws through Congress. All systems involving flow are subject to 
technical bottlenecks in the form of constraints  caused by lack of capacity in some of the 
conduits of the flow. 
For example, consider a rail system from point A to point E. Assume the system 
consists of five segments <a, b, c, d, e>. Segment c is a river for which no bridge exists: 
goods must be unloaded, taken on barges and reloaded on the other side. Shippers are 
only interested in going from A to E, thus the value of any subset of segments is zero. 
(Each segment is sine qua non, but since solutions exist for each segment, there is no sine 
qua  non  bottleneck.)  Under  these  assumptions,  the  overall  value  of  the  system  is BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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proportional to the number of trains passing from A to E times shippers’ willingness to 
pay for such transportation. 
For purposes of illustration, let us assume that shippers value speed: the less time 
in transit, the higher their willingness to pay. Obviously, any technology that shortens the 
transit time for any segment will increase the value of the system. But on this view, the 
river does not stand out as a bottleneck. An hour saved in segment a  is as good as an 
hour saved in segment c. All opportunities to reduce time-in-transit should be given equal 
consideration. 
In contrast, the number of trains going from A to E in any given time period 
depends on the capacity of the system. Again for purposes of illustration, suppose only 
one train can occupy each segment at a given time. Now assume it takes one day for a 
train to cross segments a, b, d, and e, and one week to cross the river. The capacity of 
segments a, b, d, and e is 365 trains  per year, but the capacity of segment c is only 52. 
Thus if two trains are dispatched from point A on successive days, the second will wait 
six extra days and take 13 days to cross the river. A train dispatched on day 3 will take 19 
days to cross.  
The capacity of the slowest segment constrains the capacity of the system as a 
whole. Mathematically, the capacity of the system equals the minimum capacity of its 
segments.
3 From this perspective, the river segment is a bottleneck. It is necessary to the 
functioning  of  the  whole: a  train cannot  get  from  A  to  E  without  crossing it.  Yet  it 
impedes the performance of the whole. Futhermore, improving the capacity of any other 
                                                 
3 This statement holds when there is only one path through the system. More complicated functions are 
needed when there are multiple paths, but the minimum function is prominent in all of them. The minimum 
function may also constrain performance in systems that do not involve flow. For example, a chain is only 
as strong as its weakest link; a security system is only as good as its weakest portal. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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segment has no effect on the capacity of the system as a whole. Only the bottleneck 
matters. 
All systems involving flow are subject to capacity contraints. And all capacity 
constraints take the form of a “minimum” function in the general function determining 
system value.  
Matching bottlenecks. Constraints on “matching” or “fit” are the third source of 
technical bottlenecks in man-made systems. For example, the power of the engine in an 
automobile must be matched by the power of its brakes. The strength of materials in a jet 
engine and in the airplane itself must match the force of the jets (Arthur, 2009).  
Rosenberg (1969) describes a matching bottleneck caused by the introduction of 
high-speed steel alloys in the late 19
th century: 
[I]t was impossible to take advantage of higher cutting speeds with machine tools 
designed for the older carbon steel cutting tools because they could not withstand 
the stresses and strains … . As a result, the availability of high-speed steel for the 
cutting tool quickly generated a complete redesign in machine tool components—
the structural, transmission, and control elements. (ibid. pp. 7-8) 
In other words, once high-speed steel was introduced, the three other components of a 
machine  tool—the  frame,  the  transmission,  and  the  controls—became  technical 
bottlenecks. Until these components were redesigned to match the greater force of the 
high-speed cutting tool, machine tools could not take advantage of the value-creating 
possibilities inherent in the new steel alloy.
4 
                                                 
4 There is no generally accepted term for a component like high-speed steel that generates a new set of 
technical possibilities but only if the related technical bottlenecks are solved. Yet such components are 
common in the history of technology. We might call them generative components because they generate 
both opportunities and bottlenecks.  In effect, generative components open up new design spaces, which 
can then be fruitfully explored. General purpose technologies (GPTs) are a fortiori generative components, 
but smaller innovations may be generative as well. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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In the case of machine tools, the inferior capabilities of weaker components made 
it  impossible  to  take  advantage  of  the  capabilities  of  stronger  components,  and  this 
mismatch constrained the performance of the system as a whole. In other cases involving 
matching,  there  is  no  question  of  “weak”  or  “strong,”  but  components  must  be  co-
specialized if they are to deliver high levels of functionality. For example, in the design 
of  a  tablet  computer  or  mobile  phone  handset,  the  technical  challenge  is  to  get 
components to fit together within a given form factor.  In the case of bicycle drivetrains 
(discussed below), the challenge is to have the components interact with high precision 
and minimal friction. These are different forms of matching bottlenecks. 
Sine qua non and flow bottlenecks both involve a mismatch of elements. In a sine 
qua  non  bottleneck,  the  mismatch  is  the  non-existence  of  a  critical  solution  to  a 
subproblem. In a flow bottleneck, the mismatch is in flow capacity. Hence these types of 
bottlenecks can be viewed as interesting special cases of the general case of matching 
bottlenecks. 
Bottlenecks and Modules  
Technical bottlenecks can be located within  the system and mapped onto specific 
components in the system’s technical architecture. An intensive bottleneck is caused by 
deficiency in one component or subsystem, whereas extensive bottlenecks are caused by 
deficiencies in several. The river in our railway example is an intensive bottleneck. The 
frame,  transmission,  and  control  elements  of  the  machine  tools  were  extensive 
bottlenecks. (Because technologies are nested systems, the line between intensive and 
extensive bottlenecks is somewhat arbitrary. But the distinction is useful for strategy, as 
we shall see below.) BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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It is important to note that bottlenecks are theoretically distinct from the modules 
of a technical system.  Both  bottlenecks  and  modules  can  be  located  within  a  given 
technical architecture. However, technical bottlenecks are defined by the relationship of 
component  performance  to  system  performance,  whereas  modules  are  defined  by  the 
relationship of components to each other.  
Specifically,  technical  bottlenecks  are  found  by  identifying  functional 
relationships between the characteristics of components (their capacity, size, strength, 
shape, etc.) and the performance of the system (good or bad). For example, “An 128 GB 
MP3  player  can  store  up  to  12  feature  length  movies,”  and  “Bluetooth  4.0  supports 
transfer  rates  of  25  Mbps,”  are  both  statements  about  functionality  and  possible 
bottlenecks (because 12 movies and 25 Mbps may not be enough). 
In  contrast,  modules  are  found  by  tracking  dependencies  of  the  form  “if 
Component A changes, Component B may have to change as well.” A module comprises 
a  subset  of  components  that  are  tightly  connected  to  each  other,  but  only  loosely 
connected with  the rest of the system (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). A change within one 
module can thus be made without triggering changes in the others. The statements “There 
is  a  slot  that  allows  for  expandable  storage,”  and  “Bluetooth  is  implemented  via  a 
separate chip,” are statements about modular structure. 
 
In  effect,  components  within  modules  are  subject  to  very  strong  matching 
requirements. By definition, each component in a module is co-specialized to every other, 
and all are specialized to the design rules. The operative question for designers is, where 
should  these  strong  matching  requirements  be  placed?  The  firm’s  strategy  toward 
bottlenecks determines the answer to this question. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Bottlenecks can exist within modules or across modules. But modular boundaries 
are largely under the control of system designers and as such can be shifted to better 
manage  bottlenecks.  Indeed  perceiving  bottlenecks  and  possible  modularizations  in 
relation to bottlenecks is the essence of architectural knowledge. And relocating module 
boundaries  to  better  manage  bottlenecks  is  the  essence  of  dynamic  architectural 
capabilities. 
Strategic Bottlenecks and Footprints 
Strategic bottlenecks are points of value capture and thus a source of rent in a 
technical system. A strategic bottleneck needs two things: (1) a unique solution to an 
underlying technical bottleneck; plus (2) control over access to the solution. For example, 
if  a  river  is  a  technical  bottleneck  in  a  railroad  system,  a  firm  seeking  to  capture  a 
strategic bottleneck must first build a bridge (the solution) and then prevent others from 
using the bridge unless they pay a toll (control).  
The ability to exclude others from using a given resource is a classic definition of 
a  property  right  (Alchian,  1965;  Demsetz,  1967,  1988;  Grossman  and  Hart,  1986; 
Libecap,  1989,  1993;  Hart  and  Moore,  1990;  Hart  1995;  Mahoney,  2004;  Kim  and 
Mahoney, 2005; ). Property rights over the solutions to technical bottlenecks are thus the 
basis of strategic bottlenecks. Property rights in turn can be de facto (my army controls 
the bridge; the chemical formula is a secret) or de jure (I own the bridge and police will 
arrest any trespassers; the chemical formula is patented). In modern economies, property 
rights  establish  boundaries,  hence  they  are  part  of  the  contract  structure  of  firms.  In 
aggregate, property rights are a critical dimension of industry architecture.  BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Teece (1986) called the state of property rights, particularly intellectual property 
rights  (IP),  the  “appropriability  regime”  pertaining  to  a  resource,  and  noted  that  the 
regime might be weak or strong. In strong appropriability regimes, it is easy to exclude 
others from using a particular resource. In weak appropriability regimes, it is hard. 
Under  the  resource-based  view  of  the  firm,  a  strategic  bottleneck  is  a  VRIN 
asset—valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
VRIN status follows directly from the definition of a strategic bottleneck. First, it is 
valuable because it is a solution to a problem affecting the performance of the system, 
and  the  next  best  solution  is  far  inferior.  As  the  far-superior  solution,  the  strategic 
bottleneck is more than simpy rare, it is unique. It must be inimitable, for if it can be 
copied, the copies will also solve the problem, and the bottleneck will cease to exist. By 
the  same  token,  it  must  be  non-substitutable,  for  if  substitutes  exist,  they  will  also 
constitute next best solutions, and the bottleneck again will disappear.
5 The technical, 
legal and organizational setting surrounding the bottleneck will determine whether it is 
easy or difficult to maintain the VRIN status of the technical solution and thus protect the 
strategic bottleneck. 
Property rights—the ability to determine who has access to superior solutions to 
technical bottlenecks—are thus critical to protecting a strategic bottleneck and claiming 
the associated rents. I define the footprint of a given firm to be the totality of its property 
rights over the components of a technical architecture. A firm can exercise control of 
various components of a complex system through a combination of physical control, 
secrecy, contracts, patents and copyrights. The components it controls by these means are 
deemed to be within its footprint.  
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In general, a firm’s footprint coincides with its organizational boundaries. As long 
as it obeys the law, a firm controls what goes on within its footprint. Its senior managers 
and board of directors can set policies, establish procedures, and delegate authority as 
they see fit (Freeland and Zuckerman, 2014).  Both the technical architecture and the 
contract structure of the firm lie within their purview. In contrast, a firm may influence, 
but does not control what happens outside its footprint. 
Some  firms  have  small  or  narrow  footprints.  Such  firms  perform  few  tasks 
inhouse, have few organization-specific skills or secrets, and little or no formal IP. Others 
have large or wide footprints. They perform many tasks, have many organization-specific 
skills and secrets, and large IP portfolios.  
Footprints thus constitute a third dimension of architectural knowledge about a 
technical  system,  after  bottlenecks  and  modules.  A  given  component  might  be  an 
intensive technical bottleneck located within module A in the footprint of firm X. Firm X 
might then split module A in order to find better solutions to the technical bottleneck. 
Alternatively,  a  group  of  components  might  together  form  an  extensive  technical 
bottleneck, located in modules B, C, D and E, in the footprints of firms W, X, and Y. 
Firm Z might then unite modules B, C, D, E within its own footprint, solve the technical 
bottleneck, and control a strategic bottleneck as a result.  
To create and hold a strategic bottleneck, a firm must understand the system’s 
architecture at several levels—legal and organizational as well as technical. First, what is 
the solution to the technical bottleneck? Second, what property rights to solutions does 
the legal system grant, and how can these be secured? Third, how should an organization 
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The capacity to see bottlenecks in a complex system and the ability to shift them 
by changing the underlying modular structure and/or property rights are an important set 
of dynamic capabilities, which I am calling architectural capabilities. Combining these 
with a good strategy and resources can lead to competitive advantage and associated rents 
in the short run. However, bottlenecks, modules, and footprints are not cast in stone: 
technical bottlenecks can be solved, strategic bottlenecks can be seized or destroyed, and 
modules and footprints can be redrawn. When all of these things are shifting, competitive 
advantage can only be sustained by continually investing to renew the firm’s architectural 
knowledge and capabilities.  
In  the  next  sections  I  describe  generic  ways  in  which  a  firm  can  change  the 
modular structure of a system in conjunction with its property rights and organizational 
boundaries (its footprint) to gain competitive advantage.  
3 Managing Technical Bottlenecks 
A technical system can be envisioned as a network of components connected by 
dependencies or links (Steward, 1981; Eppinger, 1991;  Baldwin and Clark, 2000).  The 
dependencies  and  links  involve  transfers  of  material,  energy  or  information  plus 
payments for goods and services (Pahl and Beitz, 1995; Baldwin 2008). 
Dependencies among components can be managed in two different ways. The 
first is for the designers to communicate in real time and work out by mutual adjustment 
how  to  handle  each  one.  The  second  is  for  an  architect  to  specify  ex  ante  what 
dependencies will exist. This specification transforms a negotiated set of dependencies 
into a rule—a design rule—that is binding on all designers. In the presence of a mutually 
binding rule, the designers do not have to communicate with one another (Parnas, 1972; BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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Parnas,  Clements  and  Weiss,  1985;  Baldwin  and  Clark,  2000).  In  effect  negotiated 
dependencies  provide  lateral  coordination,  while  design  rules  provide  hierarchical 
coordination. 
Design rules place more restrictions on the final architecture of the system than 
dependencies managed through real-time communication and mutual adjustment. There 
is  less  room  in  a  rule  for  give-and-take,  and  thus  some  new  ideas  may  not  be 
accommodated.  Notwithstanding  this  fact,  putting  design  rules  in  place  does  not 
necessarily hurt system performance. Architectural knowledge can be used to determine 
which design rules offer little or no harm to the overall system.  
A firm can manage technical bottlenecks in two fundamentally different ways. In 
some  cases  it  will  be  advantageous  to  split  a  module  in  order  to  isolate  bottleneck 
components and maintain a narrow footprint in the underlying technical architecture. In 
other cases, it will be advantageous to integrate several components of a bottleneck into a 
single module and maintain a correspondingly wide footprint in the architecture.  
Different  types  of  firms  will  obtain  different  benefits  from  pursuing  each 
approach  (Teece,  1996).  A  strategy  of  combining  modules  might  be  feasible  and 
attractive for a large firm but out of reach for a smaller one. Conversely, small firms, with 
no organizational hierarchy or vested interests, can often move swiftly to isolate technical 
bottlenecks and and thus claim strategic bottlenecks in promising new markets. Figuring 
out which approach is better requires deep knowledge and fine judgment—the bedrock of 
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Isolating bottlenecks within a small footprint 
 When a technical bottleneck involves only a few components it is often possible 
to change the dependencies via design rules to isolate the bottleneck components in a 
separate module. Isolating the bottleneck has a number of benefits, both technological  
and  strategic.  From  a  technological  perspective,  the  bottleneck  component  can  be 
redesigned to achieve higher performance without triggering negative interactions with 
components outside the bottleneck. As a result, the cost and time needed to instigate new 
rounds of technical improvement will decrease (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). And because 
it is a bottleneck, the performance of the whole system will improve as the performance 
of this part improves. The firm that owns the superior solution to the bottleneck can then 
charge users based on the incremental boost to system performance. 
Isolating the bottleneck has strategic benefits, especially to (1) small firms with 
limited resources; and (2) second movers trying to overtake an incumbent with a more 
integrated architecture. Transaction costs are low at module boundaries (Baldwin, 2008) 
and non-bottleneck components are (by definition) substitutable. Thus the firm that owns 
the  bottleneck  solution  can  outsource  design  and  production  of  non-bottleneck 
components. There will (again by definition) be several adequate alternatives for each 
non-bottleneck  component,  hence  the  focal  firm  should  be  able  to  source  these 
components on competitive terms. The firm will operate with a “small footprint.”  
Two  financial  advantages  arise  from a  small  footprint. First,  because  it  needs 
proportionately less capital to scale its operations, the firm with a small footprint will 
have a “sustainable growth” advantage (Higgins, 1977; Donaldson, 1984; Baldwin and 
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more  rapidly  than  rivals  with  larger  footprints.  Second,  because  its  rate  of  return  on 
capital is higher than its rivals’, the firm can issue new equity on better terms, with less 
dilution to existing investors. This further increases the growth rates the firm can achieve 
without harm to its owners. In dynamic markets with network effects, which are subject 
to “tipping”,
6 the ability to grow fast and profitably is a key determinant of success (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985, 1992, 1994; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). 
In  summary,  the  isolating  strategy  depends  on  achieving  a  superior,  unique 
solution and exclusive control of an intensive technical bottleneck. The controlled part 
constitutes the firm’s “footprint” in the overall system, hence this is a “small footprint” 
strategy  (Baldwin  and  Clark,  2006).  Architectural  knowledge  and  capabilities  are 
required  to  locate  and  solve  the  technical  bottleneck,  to  modularize  the  technical 
architecture,  and  to  set  up  the  contract  structure  needed  to  obtain  non-bottleneck 
components (Fine and Whitney, 1996; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Argyres and Mayer, 
2007; Blair, O’Connor, Kirchhoefer, 2011).  
In the 1990s, Sun Microsystems and Dell Computer both pursued small footprint 
strategies with some success. Highlights of these two cases are given below. Further 
details may be found in Baldwin and Clark (1997a, 2006). 
Sun Microsystems. Sun’s architectural capabilities were based on new methods 
measuring flows of instructions in computer hardware and software systems.
7 Using these 
methods, Sun’s engineers identified memory management as a critical constraint limiting 
the calculating capacity of engineering workstations. In effect, the principal bottleneck in 
                                                 
6 Tipping is “the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in terms of popularity once it has 
gained an initial edge” (Katz and Shapiro, 1994, p.106).  
7 In their 1990 and 1994 textbooks, Hennessy and Patterson describe these new architectural methods in 
detail.  Hennessy  and  Patterson’s  first  textbook  was  published  in  1990.  Sun’s  founders,  Andreas 
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the  technical  architecture  of  engineering  workstations  was  a  flow  bottleneck  from 
memory to the CPU. In the second generation of Sun’s products, the engineers addressed 
this constraint with a specially designed and patented chip and associated code in the 
operating system (Baldwin and Clark, 1997a).  
This technical strategy in turn allowed Sun to adopt a small footprint contract 
structure. Most of the components in Sun’s systems were “cheap, off-the-shelf” parts. 
Sun also used Unix, a functional and cheap operating system, and Ethernet, a freely 
available set of network protocols, instead of developing its own proprietary operating 
system or network software.
  
Sun’s chief rival Apollo Computer adopted a very different technical strategy. Its 
engineers combined specific hardware designs with a proprietary operating system plus 
firm-specific network protocols and software. An Apollo system operated with Apollo 
components or not at all. All parts were co-specialized and produced by Apollo alone. 
Apollo had to design and manufacture all parts, thus it had large footprint in the technical 
architecture.  
Events  proved  Sun’s  architectural  knowledge  and  strategy  to  be  superior.  By 
isolating the memory management bottleneck, Sun was able to build machines that were 
as fast as Apollo’s but cost less. And because it manufactured fewer components inhouse, 
Sun inventories turned over more quickly, reducing its need for capital. Sun used the 
financial advantages associated with its small footprint to drive down product prices and 
to grow very fast. Apollo was unable to keep pace. It became unprofitable and cash-
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Dell  Computer.  Dell’s  architectural  capabilities  were  rooted  in  the  superior 
management  of  working  capital.  In  the  manufacturing  of  personal  computers,  Dell’s 
managers saw that order-taking and assembly were a technical bottleneck, and sought to 
maximize throughput for these stages of the production process. Dell became formidably 
more efficient than its rivals in this narrow set of activities. It could produce similar 
goods at lower cost, in less time, with less working capital. 
Like Sun, Dell used its financial advantage to attack its rivals by driving prices 
down. The company grew very rapidly, with essentially no need for external capital.
8 As 
it  grew,  moreover,  Dell  exercised  more  power  over  its  non-bottleneck  suppliers.  It 
demanded and received generous trade credit, which gave it more cash and allowed the 
company to grow even faster. The other first-generation PC manufacturers could not 
match Dell’s prices or growth and were forced to exit.  
Interestingly, however, Dell never converted its original architectural capabilities 
into  dynamic  capabilities  to  manage  architecture  more  broadly.  Instead  it  defined 
innovation as a quest for higher return on invested capital (ROIC). When demand for PCs 
leveled off in 2009, and Chinese manufacturers, like Lenovo, became low-cost suppliers, 
Dell struggled to find new products and new distribution channels, but to no avail. In 
2013, Dell became a private company through a leveraged buyout.  
Integrating bottlenecks within a large footprint 
Sun and Dell each succeeded by isolating a strategic bottleneck within a small 
footprint.  They  were  able  to  employ  this  strategy  because  the  underlying  technical 
bottlenecks  were  intensive,  that  is,  relatively  narrow  in  scope.  In  contrast,  some 
                                                 
8 Much of the time, Dell had negative working capital, thus the more it grew, the more cash came into the 
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bottlenecks are extensive, involving a wide range of components all of which must be 
redesigned  to  solve  the  bottleneck  (Iansiti  and  Clark,  1993).  Addressing  extensive 
bottlenecks requires coordinated change in all the components in the bottleneck. One way 
to  achieve  such  coordination  is  to  break  down  modular  boundaries  and  integrate  the 
bottleneck components within a single large module. 
In comparison to the isolating strategy described above, the integrating strategy 
requires  more  resources.  Improving  the  joint  performance  of  many  interdependent 
components is harder than working on just a few, but the rewards in terms of better 
performance  can  be  commensurably  high.  Because  the  technical  architecture  is  not 
modular, there will be few external points of attachment to the new system (Fixson and 
Park, 2008). Rivals must then recreate the whole system in order to compete. Given this 
high  bar,  as  long  as  the  performance  of  the  integrated  system  is  superior  to  that  of 
comparable  modular  systems,  an  extensive  strategic  bottleneck  may  be  virtually 
unassailable.
9 
Firms pursuing an integrative strategy must design many components and perform 
many tasks within their boundaries. Necessarily, such firms will have large footprints. 
When the bottleneck in question is related to the flow of materials in production, such 
firms will become vertically integrated. Indeed, as documented by Alfred Chandler, the 
“modern  corporations”  that  arose  in  the  1880s  succeeded  by  solving  extensive  flow 
bottlenecks via integrative, large-footprint strategies. More recently, the Japanese bike 
drivetrain manufacturer Shimano addressed a matching bottleneck related to gear shifting 
also by using an integrative, large-footprint strategy. Highlights of these examples are 
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discussed below. Further details can be found in Chandler (1977, 1986) and Fixson and 
Park (2008).  
Modern Corporations. The firms Alfred Chandler labeled “modern corporations” 
grew  up  in  response  to  opportunities  made  possible  by  high  speed,  mechanized 
production systems, rapid reliable transportation via railroads, and fast communication 
via telegraph (Chandler, 1986). Given these new technologies, the previous systems of 
production  and  distribution  were  quickly  shown  to  be  shot  through  with  bottlenecks. 
Chandler (1962) quotes Charles R. Flint, an organizer of US Rubber Company, on the 
advantages of vertical integration: 
[T]he  specialization  of  manufacture  on  a  large  scale  …  permits  the  fullest 
utilization of special machinery and processes, thus decreasing costs; the standard 
of quality is fixed and raised; those plants which are best equipped and most 
advantageously situated are run continuously …; there is no multiplication of the 
means of distribution …; terms and conditions of sales become more uniform, and 
credits through comparison are more safely granted; the aggregate of stocks [i.e., 
inventories]  is  greatly  reduced  …;  greater  skill  in  management  accrues  to  the 
benefit of the whole, instead of the part; and large advantages are realized through 
comparative accounting and comparative administration. (pp. 34-35) 
 
In  other  words,  with  the  new  machine  technologies,  the  capacity  of  the 
manufacturing stages of production increased dramatically. But those advantages could 
only be realized if “those plants … are run continuously.” Hence flow through the system 
had to be both high (close to capacity) and consistent.  
The old methods of purchasing raw materials and distributing finished goods were 
capacity  constrained,  thus  immediately  became  technical  bottlenecks  in  the  general 
system of mass production. Addressing these constraints uncovered subsidiary technical 
bottlenecks in inventory, transactions processing, and the management of trade credit. 
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such bottlenecks and the entire system became more efficient as the technical bottlenecks 
were systematically removed.
10  
In  industries  where  the  cost  advantages  of  mechanized  plants  depended  on 
maintaining a constant, high level of throughput, the techniques of flow management 
created  such  large    cost  savings  that  only  vertically  integrated  enterprises  remained 
competitive.  In  such  industries,  corporations  with  large  footprints  administered  by 
professional managers became the dominant form of organization. These companies are a 
prime  example  of  the  potential  advantages  of  pursuing  a  large-footprint  strategy  that 
integrates  many  components  of  a  bottleneck  in  a  non-modular  technical  architecture 
within a single corporation.  
Indeed  any  technical  system  whose  performance  rests  on  balanced  flows  will 
generate shifting bottlenecks that need constant oversight and coordination in real time. 
Today, however, the first line of monitoring and adjustment is usually done by computers 
such as numerical control systems, scheduling systems, and automated trading systems. 
Flows through computer mediated systems have increased accordingly. Transactions are 
also cheaper today and thus many high-flow, automated systems cross firm boundaries. 
Thus, in many industries, intermediate markets and firms with “vertically permeable” 
boundaries have replaced purely vertically integrated firms (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides 
and Billinger, 2006; Luo et. al. 2012; Kapoor, 2013; Atalay, Hortascu and Syverson, 
2014).   
Shimano.  The  Japanese  bike  drivetrain  manufacturer,  Shimano,  illustrates  the 
solution of an extensive matching bottleneck via integration of component designs within 
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a  large  footprint.  A  standard  bicycle  drivetrain  is  made  up  of  six  components:  the 
freewheel, chain, hub, shifter, derailleur,and brake levers.  In the early 1980s the standard 
drivetrain  architecture  was  highly  modular,  and  components  made  by  different 
manufacturers could be mixed and matched at will. However, the standard drivetrain had 
two deficiencies with respect to shifting. First, the rider had to carefully adjust the chain 
after shifting (to center the chain on the sprocket). This took time (a problem for racing) 
and generally required taking a hand off the handlebars (a problem for mountain biking). 
Second, the rider had to be pedalling during the shift.  
Shimano addressed these functional deficiencies by redesigning five of the six 
components to be co-specialized to very tight tolerances. No longer would any chain 
work with any derailleur, freewheel or hub: each component had to be Shimano-made. 
(Today,  the  Shimano  Hyperglide™  cassette  body  has  become  the  de  facto  industry 
standard and several manufacturers make compatible parts. However, it is claimed that 
suboptimal shifting results from mixing chains and hubs from different companies.
11) 
The functional superiority of the new technical architecture turned the drivetrain 
from  a  technical  bottleneck  into  a  strategic  bottleneck.  Over  the  course  of  six  years 
(1984-1990) following the introduction of the new drivetrain, Shimano’s market share 
increased from approximately 20% in both road and mountain bicycles to 50% in road 
bicycles and almost 80% in mountain bicycles. Most of Shimano’s competitors were 
forced to exit. Shimano continues to dominate the industry today. 
Do all extensive bottlenecks require integration? Given these examples, it is 
natural to ask whether resolving extensive technical bottlenecks requires integration of 
                                                 
11 http://sheldonbrown.com/k7.html#sram (viewed 8/30/14). 
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components in a single module and a correspondingly large footprint. The answer is “no.” 
As indicated above, coordination in the design of components can be achieved in two 
ways: through integration, which facilitates lateral communication and coordination or 
through modularization, which achieves hierarchical coordination via design rules.
12  
The transition from traditional freight to containerized shipping is an example of 
an  extensive  bottleneck  that  was  addressed  via  hierarchical  coordination.  To  handle 
containers efficiently, new docking facilities had to be built at every major port. Each 
port was a separate project (a module). Ships and railcars were redesigned as another set 
of modular projects. The dimensions of the containers served as implicit design rules, 
providing  hierarchical  coordination  throughout  the  system.  (See  Levinson  (2006)  for 
additional details.) 
In general, the less  that is known about a given technical architecture and the 
location of technical bottlenecks, the more advantageous is lateral communication and 
coordination  (Monteverde  and  Teece,  1982;  Monteverde,  1995).  And,  because 
transaction  costs  are  high  within  modules,  a  large  footprint  is  often  the  most  cost-
effective way to organize the resulting non-routine problem-solving process (Nickerson 
and  Zenger,  2004;  Baldwin  2008;  Colfer  and  Baldwin,  2010).  However,  lateral 
coordination is time-consuming and may not converge on a solution (Steward, 1981; 
Eppinger, 1991; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). In contrast, a modular architecture restricts 
alternatives but often saves time by limiting the degree to which changes in the design of 
one component can propagate through the system (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).  
Thus integration within a single module is a good way to develop truly novel 
technical systems, but if the system is large, it will take a very long time to complete. For 
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example, the ATLAS particle detector at CERN, a very large and novel project, was 
designed in an integrated fashion and took eighteen years to go from concept to working 
system (Tuertscher, Garud and Kumaraswamy, 2014). 
4 Protecting Strategic Bottlenecks 
The value of a strategic bottleneck is proportional to the difference it makes in the 
value of the system relative to the next best solution. If the difference  is large, then the 
rent stream to the bottleneck owner will be commensurately high. For instance, in the 
railway example above suppose building a bridge over the river cuts transit time on this 
segment from one week to one day. The capacity of the system would then increase from 
52 to 365 trains per year. The owner of the bridge should be able to capture some fraction 
of the value thus created.
13 
The firm that owns a strategic bottleneck must protect it to ensure that its value 
remains  high.  The  main  technical  threat  is  the  arrival  of  almost-as-good  or  better 
solutions to the underlying technical bottleneck. The main legal threat is loss of control of 
the solution. Intellectual property rights over the design of the solution are one way to 
defend  a  strategic  bottleneck  against  both  threats.  Indeed,  in  strong  appropriability 
regimes,  a  good  patent  or  copyright  may  be  all  that  is  needed  (Teece,  1986).  But 
intellectual property rights, especially patents, always exist in the shadow of litigation  
and thus are uncertain (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). For example, of all patents that are 
litigated, approximately half are invalidated. (For this reason, Lemley and Shapiro (2005) 
call patents “probabilistic property rights.”) What is certain is that the higher the value of 
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the strategic bottleneck, the higher the legal costs of defending it and the greater the legal 
risks. 
The modular structure of the system can also be modified to protect a strategic 
bottleneck. To understand how modularity works in this context, we must first distinguish 
between modularity in production and modularity in use (Baldwin and Clark, 1997b; 
Sako  and  Murray,  1999;  Baldwin  and  Clark,  2000;  Baldwin  and  Henkel,  2014). 
Modularity  in  production  refers  to  the  way  tasks  of  production  are  divided  among 
separate groups. The groups may be business units in a single firm or different firms in a 
supply network. If the tasks and knowledge of different groups do not overlap and the 
groups do not communicate, the system is modular in production. In contrast, modularity 
in use refers to way the system is perceived by users. A single, indivisible item is not 
modular in use. A system that can be configured by mixing and matching modules and 
adding or replacing modules is modular in use. 
Modularity in production protects the bottleneck 
One of the features of modules is that they “hide information” from other modules 
(Parnas, 1972; Parnas et. al., 1985; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). People working on module 
A don’t have to know what’s going on inside module B. Thus through modularity, it is 
possible to divide up knowledge about components so that no single employee or supplier 
can replicate the whole. Modularity in production can thus protect a strategic bottleneck 
from being replicated by suppliers and employees of the focal firm (Baldwin and Henkel, 
2014). 
Liebeskind (1997), Henkel, Baldwin and Shih (2013) and Baldwin and Henkel 
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organizational secrets. Highlights are given below: the original papers provide further 
details. 
Michelin  Radial  Tires.  In  the  1960s,  Michelin  is  reported  to  have  used 
modularity in production to protect its strategic bottleneck in radial tires. According to 
Liebeskind (1997): 
During  the  1960s,  Michelin  had  a  monopoly  on  knowledge  relating  to  the 
production  of  high  quality  steel-belted  radial  tire  manufacturing.  In  order  to 
preserve this monopoly, manufacturing was divided into two separate processes: 
steel  belt  manufacturing,  and  tire  production.  Employees  were  not  rotated 
between  these  manufacturing  processes  in  a  deliberate  effort  to  restrict  the 
number of employees that had knowledge about both processes. As a result, only 
a handful of very senior managers within Michelin were knowledgeable about the 
entire manufacturing process (p. 645). 
 
Production and R&D in Countries with Weak IP Protection. In interviews 
conducted in Brazil and Mexico, Sherwood (1990) reports that, in many instances, only 
the founder of a company would know the details of all steps in the production process, 
though  key  employees  would  know  parts.  In  a  similar  vein,  Schotter  and  Teagarden 
(2014) quote a former general manager on manufacturing processes in China: 
Processes were broken down into those elements critical to the business so that no 
one single individual had access to all of them. As general manager, I was the 
only one who knew the entire manufacturing process. Extrusion dies, for example, 
were  critical  to  the  manufacturing  process.  These  were  kept  overnight  in  a 
separate vault that could only be opened by one person, me, using a lock and key. 
Other  staff  members  were  never  allowed  to  put  the  dies  into  the  extrusion 
machine. (p. 45) 
 
Zhao  (2006)  argues  that  multinationals  with  research  facilities  in  emerging 
nations  often  assign  them  projects  with  little  stand-alone  value.  Supporting  this 
contention, she finds that patents filed by subsidiaries of multinationals in countries with 
weak IP rights have more value in conjunction with parent company patents than third 
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Using modularity in production to protect a strategic bottleneck can be costly, 
however.  Modularizing  production  replaces  lateral  coordination  with  hierarchical 
coordination via design rules. As indicated above, this can be fatal for the production of 
novel systems, where unknown interdependencies can result in conflicts that cause the 
whole  system  to  crash.  In  systems  where  throughput  is  a  key  determinant  of  cost, 
excessive modularization can also slow down the flow and increase inventories needed 
for adequate buffering (Zhou, 2014). Finally, some technologies are more amenable to 
modularization than others: for example, electronic chips are highly modular, whereas 
automobile parts must often be co-designed in order to work together in the same vehicle 
(Whitney, 2004; Luo et. al, 2012).  
Modularity in use exposes the bottleneck 
In  contrast  to  modularity  in  production,  modularity  in  use  exposes  a  strategic 
bottleneck to a greater threat of imitation or substitution by third parties (Rivkin, 2000; 
Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj, Levinthal and Roy, 2008). When a system is modular in use, 
the owner of the bottleneck offers modules as a separate products and must provide ways 
to attach new modules to the system. Rivals then do not have to replicate the system as a 
whole, but can concentrate on a single module. In contrast, non-modular “black box” 
products have no separate components and no external points of attachment. Rivals must 
then recreate the whole system or stay out of the game. 
It follows that best way to protect a strategic bottleneck is to make it modular in 
production but not modular in use. The Apple iPhone handset is such a device. It contains 
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modular  in  production.
14 But  it  is  sold  as  an  single,  indivisible  unit  with  few 
configuration options, hence it is not modular in use.
15  
When  a  given  system  is  modular  in  use,  both  module  designs  and  standards 
governing interoperability may be protected intellectual property. Quite often, however, 
IP protection is inadequate to prevent imitation or substitution by third parties. To make 
imitation and substitution more difficult, some firms have opted to make modules larger 
and more complex that they need to be for purely functional purposes.  
Integrating functions within a single module necessarily reduces user options. In 
some  cases,  especially  with  inexpensive,  non-durable  items,  users  may  be  happy  to 
sacrifice  configuration  and  upgrade  options  for  higher  performance  or  lower  cost.  In 
other cases, especially with costly, durable items, users may see built-in options as a 
critical  part  of  the  value  proposition.  They  will  then  choose  to  purchase  modular, 
upgradable systems over integrated, non-upgradable products. 
The case of the IBM PC illustrates the risks modularity in use poses to a strategic 
bottleneck. The case of the Apple Macintosh illustrates the offsetting risks of restricting 
users’ options. Finally the case of HP and Canon’s inkjet printers illustrates the strategy 
of making user modules more complex to prevent imitation and substitution.  
IBM  PC.  The  original  IBM  PC  had  a  highly  modular  technical  architecture. 
Because IBM was a late entrant to the PC market and because the PC division was 
resource contrained, the PC’s managers adopted a small footprint strategy. They focused 
on securing a small number of strategic bottlenecks and outsourced all other components 
                                                 
14  See  https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown/iPhone+5+Teardown/10525  (viewed  9/2/14)  for  a  list  of 
components of the iPhone 5 components and manufacturers. 
15 In contrast the application software is highly modular in use. See the discussion of user options below. BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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of the PC system, including the central processor (from Intel) and the operating system 
(from Microsoft). (Ferguson and Morris, 1993.) 
One  of  IBM’s  strategic  bottlenecks  was  the  so-called  BIOS,  the  Basic  Input 
Output System. A BIOS is very much like a bridge connecting peripheral devices to the 
central processing unit (CPU). Without using the BIOS, software written for the PC could 
not access peripheral devices, such as disk drives, printers, keyboards, and monitors.  
The BIOS had to be published for the benefit of external software and hardware 
developers.  It was protected by copyright, and also etched in the circuits of a read-only 
memory (ROM) chip. However, the chip was relatively small (35KB of memory). 
Shortly after the IBM PC was introduced, Compaq and Phoenix Technologies 
both  legally  copied  the  PC  BIOS  using  a  practice  known  as  “clean  room  reverse 
engineering.”
16 With  the  reverse-engineered  BIOS  in  hand,  it  was  relatively  easy  for 
other manufacturers to create clones of the IBM PC. (Clones were substitutes that were 
fully compatible with IBM PCs, hence could run software and use peripheral devices 
developed for IBM machines.)  By 1986, Compaq and Taiwanese clone makers were 
flooding the market with IBM-compatible machines.  
In this way, IBM lost control of a major strategic bottleneck in the PC’s technical 
architecture. As the clone makers grew, it also lost its competitive advantage as low-cost 
producer. The PC division struggled to remain profitable until it was sold to Lenovo in 
2004. 
                                                 
16 Clean room reverse engineering is a method of copying a design without infringing on copyrights or 
trade secrets associated with it. Typically one group of engineers will examine the behavior of an artifact 
and write up a detailed specification. Another group with no knowledge of the original design will then 
implement the specification. The implementation constitutes an independent invention, though its behavior 
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Apple Macintosh. Unlike IBM, Apple opted to make the Macintosh BIOS an 
integral part of its operating system (OS). According to one technical observer: 
[T]he Mac BIOS is very large and complex and is essentially part of the OS, 
unlike the much simpler and more easily duplicated BIOS found on PCs. The 
greater complexity and integration has allowed both the Mac BIOS and OS to 
escape  any  clean-room  duplication  efforts.  This  means  that  without  Apple’s 
blessing  (in  the  form  of  licensing),  no  Mac  clones  are  likely  ever  to  exist. 
(Mueller, 2003, p. 28) 
 
Apple  had  a  correspondingly  large  footprint  in  the  Macintosh’s  technical 
architecture. Users not only had to purchase their computers from Apple, but also their 
printers,  disk  drives,  keyboards,  and  mice.  Apple  also  wrote  most  of  the  application 
software.  Apple  hardware  and  software  were  offered  for  sale  at  high  markups.  User 
options for the system were largely limited to what Apple wanted to supply.  
In contrast, the IBM managers adopted what is now called an “open” platform 
strategy  (Ferguson  and  Morris,  1993;  Gawer  and  Cusumano,  2002;  West,  2003; 
Boudreau, 2010; Baldwin and Woodard, 2011; Eisenmann, Parker and Van Allstyne, 
2011;  Gawer,  2014).    They  actively  recruited  hardware  manufacturers  to  build 
complementary peripheral devices and software developers to write programs that would 
run  on  the  PC.  The  PC’s  expandability  via  third-party  hardware  and  software  was 
prominently featured in its early marketing campaigns.  
In this fashion, perhaps only half consciously, IBM tapped into a powerful set of 
“indirect network effects” (Church and Gandal, 1992; Rochet and Tirole, 2003).  Indirect 
network  effects  arise  when  a  particular  institution  (the  platform)  permits  interactions 
between  two  or  more  types  of  participants,  each  of  which  has  reason  to  value  the 
presence of the other. In the case of computer platforms like the IBM PC, computer users 
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because these increase their options and extend the useful life of their machines. At the 
same time, software developers and peripheral manufacturers have reason to value large 
numbers of users, because they face economies of scale in development and production. 
Thus computer users will be attracted to platforms with more peripherals and software, 
while  peripheral  manufacturers  and  software  developers  will  seek  out  platforms  with 
more users. 
Platforms with indirect network effects often enjoy the dynamics of increasing 
returns to scale: as the numbers on one side grow, the numbers on the other side grow 
apace  (Eisenmann,  Parker  and  Van  Allstyne,  2006;  Evans,  Hagiu  and  Schmalensee, 
2006). The result can be a winner-take-all outcome where the market “tips” and most 
participants converge on a single platform (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). IBM managers set 
loose this dynamic when they introduced the open, modular IBM PC in 1981. By 1987, 
IBM-compatible computers accounted for over 60% of the personal computer market; 
this figure rose to over 90% in the early 1990s.
17 
The  upshot  is  that,  whereas  the  Apple  Macintosh  was  better  protected  from 
imitation and substitution by virtue of its non-modular BIOS and operating system, the 
IBM PC platform offered a far more attractive value proposition to users and hardware 
and  software  developers.  Users  could  purchase  many  compatible,  low-cost  hardware 
devices and software applications. Hardware manufacturers and software developers had 
the corresponding lure of many users. The market overwhelmingly voted for the IBM PC, 
and this standard dominated the personal computer industry long after IBM bowed out. 
                                                 
17 http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/08/from-altair-to-ipad-35-years-of-personal-computer-market-share 
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Inkjet Printers. When a system must be modular in use, one way to protect a 
strategic  bottleneck  is  to  embed  a  critical  component  within  a  larger,  more  complex 
module that is harder to copy. This principle can be seen at work in the case of inkjet 
printers (Henkel, Baldwin, and Shih, 2013).  
Printers are made up of three components: an ink cartridge; a printhead; and the 
rest of the printer.
18 To provide for ink replacement, the cartridge must be modular in use. 
But an ink cartridge by itself is a very simple artifact, which is easy to copy and difficult 
to protect via patents. Printheads, in contrast, are more complex and have effective patent 
protection. Thus HP and Canon both elected to integrate the printhead with the cartridge, 
even though it could have been made part of the printer. Combining the printhead and ink 
in a single, indivisible unit made the cartridges more difficult to imitate and also meant 
that the printhead’s patents could be used to protect the cartridge from imitation.  
5 Acquiring Architectural Knowledge and Capabilities 
How does a firm acquire architectural knowledge and capabilities that allow it to 
capture  valuable  rent  streams  in  complex  and  evolving  technical  systems?  Large 
technical systems are generally not easy to understand (Perrow, 1984). Inconveniently, 
they  tend  to  change  via  local  adaptation  and  grow  by  accretion.  Changes  are  often 
undocumented. The end result is a system no one understands, burdened with “technical 
debt”  that  stands  in  the  way  of  constructive  change.  Such  systems  are  often  labeled 
“hairballs,” or “great balls of mud,” by the technicians who must coax them to perform. 
                                                 
18 An ink cartridge is a reservoir of liquid ink that gets squirted onto the printhead. The printhead takes the 
ink and applies it in precise ways to form characters. The rest of the printer moves the paper and manages 
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Architectural  knowledge  begins  with  seeing  a  complex  system  as  a  working 
whole, but also seeing that is made up of distinct components. The system as a whole has 
a purpose (Arthur, 2009) and its performance against its purpose can be measured in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Each component in turn contributes in some way to 
the performance of the system as a whole.  Observers gain knowledge about technical 
bottlenecks by studying each component in relation to the whole and assessing how the 
properties of a given component enable or impede the performance of the system.  
In flow systems, technical bottlenecks give rise to delays and/or inventory buildup 
ahead of the bottleneck and slack capacity below it. However, given even moderately 
complicated flows, local adaptations and work-arounds often mask the true location of 
the  bottlenecks  (Goldratt,  1990).  Generally  it  is  necessary  to  track  the  progress  of 
representative flow units through the system, recording the times spent in each processing 
stage or buffer. The observer must then aggregate over a typical mixture of paths to 
identify the points that place the greatest constraints on overall system capacity.  Goldratt 
(1990)  describes  this  process  for  manufacturing  and  retail  services  and  project 
management. Patterson and Hennessy (1994) describe how to track instructions flowing 
through computer systems. The operative goal for resolving technical bottlenecks in flow 
systems is Amdahl’s Law: “Make the common case fast.” 
Matching bottlenecks, by definition, involve several components, and thus are 
generally harder to identify than flow bottlenecks. Learning about the bottleneck and 
solving it tend to merge into the same trial-and-error process. For example, in the case of 
bicycle drivetrains, discussed above, Shimano engineers had to form the conjecture that 
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would make shifting more precise and faster. They then had to test that conjecture by 
redesigning  and  testing  various  configurations.  Today,  computer  simulation  and  3-D 
CAD  modeling  can  shorten  the  experimental  generate-test  cycle,  and  thus  greatly 
accelerate the process of finding a better match. 
Solving a technical bottleneck also requires knowledge of how modular structure 
can  be  changed  to  isolate  or  integrate  the  components  in  the  bottleneck.  One  builds 
knowledge of modular structure by asking the question, “If this component’s design were 
changed,  what  other  components  might  have  to  change  as  a  result?”  (Parnas,  1972; 
Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Once direct linkages of this type have been identified, they 
can be aggregated into a network graph and summarized in terms of a Design Structure 
Matrix (DSM) (Steward, 1981; Eppinger, 1991; Eppinger et al. 1994; Browning, 2001). 
Unfortunately, direct linkages by themselves do not reveal the modular structure 
of the system. The DSM must be organized in particular ways to reveal hierarchy (chains 
of dependencies) and modules (cyclic groups of dependencies). Baldwin, MacCormack 
and  Rusnak  (2014)  provide  an  algorithm  for  discovering  and  displaying  the  modular 
structure of large technical systems. In a study of over 1000 software codebases (in 17 
families), they found that the great majority of these systems had a “core-periphery” 
structure,  that  is,  there  was  one  dominant  cyclic  group  (the  “Core”).  However,  the 
existence and composition of the Core and the location of other components in relation to 
the Core was not evident from the systems’ documentation. Thus the modular structure of 
these software systems was hidden, even to the systems’ own developers. 
Finally,  protecting  strategic  bottlenecks  requires  knowledge  of  organizational 
boundaries  and  property  rights.  In  developed  countries,  property  rights  to  physical BOTTLENECKS, MODULES …    CARLISS Y. BALDWIN   
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goods—products, machinery and equipment, buildings and land—are usually fairly easy 
to  ascertain  and  enforce.  However,  to  an  increasing  degree,  control  of  strategic 
bottlenecks rests on control of knowledge through secrecy and/or intellectual property 
rights. Thus to occupy a secure position with respect to a strategic bottleneck, a firm must 
know what parts of its knowledge are critical to maintaining exclusive control of the 
bottleneck  solution.  It  must  also  know  who  might  threaten  the  bottleneck  through 
imitation or substitution or by contesting the firm’s claims to the underlying IP.  
6 Conclusion 
Large  technical  systems  made  up  of  many  interoperable  components  are 
becoming  more  common  every  day.  Many  of  these  systems,  like  tablet  computers, 
smartphones and the Internet, are based on digital information technologies. Others, like 
the electrical grid, the financial payments system, and all modern factories, rely on digital 
technologies. Digital information technology has made it possible to create ever larger 
technical systems and every faster flows. At the same time, digital technology provides a 
common  substrate  for  design,  communication,  and  control.  The  commonality  of  bits 
allows  both  businesses  and  society  to  come  ever  closer  to  the  the  goal  of  universal 
compatibility and interoperability for all technical systems.  
This paper asks the question: how do firms create and capture value in large 
technical  systems?  To  answer  this  question,  it  is  first  necessary  to  develop  ways  of 
describing such systems.  
The architecture of a technical system is an abstract description of what it does 
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and  shows,  from  a  technological  perspective,  how  to  make  the  system.  A  contract 
structure,  is  a  social  architecture,  including  organization,  transactions,  contracts,  and 
property rights, that is overlaid on the technical architecture to assemble resources, assign 
tasks,  transfer  goods,  and  collect  compensation.  An  industry  architecture  is  the 
aggregation of contract structures within a given sector of the economy.  
Within a large technical system, I’ve argued that the points of both value creation 
and value capture are the system’s bottlenecks. In prior work, a number of scholars, 
including  Rosenberg  (1969),  Teece  (1986),  Langlois  and  Robertson  (1992),  Langlois 
(2002, 2007), Baldwin and Clark (2006), Jacobides et. al. (2006), Ethiraj (2007), Pisano 
and Teece (2008), and Henkel and Hoffmann (2014), have also said that bottlenecks are 
key drivers of technical change and sources of competitive advantage.  
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is point out that bottlenecks 
come in two flavors. Technical bottlenecks are important technical problems to be solved. 
Once a solution is found, it may be combined with property rights and become a strategic 
bottleneck and a source of rents. Bottlenecks exist within the modular structure of a given 
technical  system.  A  firm’s  footprint  determines  its  organizational  boundaries  and 
property rights, and thus the extent of its control over various bottlenecks in the system. 
Dynamic  architectural  capabilities  give  firms  the  ability  to  understand  a  large 
technical system coherently and change it in ways that are competitively advantageous. 
In essence, these capabilities amount to the ability to find and solve technical bottlenecks 
and hold and protect strategic bottlenecks. Modular structure, organizational boundaries, 
and property rights are all tools the firm can use for this purpose. For example, modular 
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Relatively small firms with narrow footprints can profit from the isolating strategy; larger 
firms with wide footprints are better positioned to pursue the integrating strategy. In 
addition, modularity in production can be used to protect a strategic bottleneck: in a 
modular production system, each agent will know part of the technical recipe, but only a 
few trusted agents will know the whole. In contrast, modularity in use exposes a strategic 
bottleneck to imitation and substitution by third parties.  However, modularity in use also 
creates user options, which may be key parts of the firm’s value proposition. 
I close the paper by suggesting two areas of opportunity for future work. 
First of all, this paper has only considered how a single firm can manage a single 
technical  or  strategic  bottleneck.  However,  large  technical  systems  have  many 
bottlenecks at different levels of the technical design hierarchy. Also, it is now rare for 
large technical systems to be contained within the boundaries of a single firms. Instead, 
technically related activities are often distributed across many firms, as well as other 
institutions,  including  standard-setting  organizations  and  open  source  development 
communities. Further work is needed to understand how bottlenecks can be managed 
when knowledge and property rights are distributed among many independent agents. 
A  related  theoretical  problem  is  to  develop  tractable  ways  of  representing 
bottlenecks  in  large  technical  systems.  Value  creation  and  capture  both  arise  in  the 
domain of functions, because functions and functionality determine a user’s inclination to 
buy and willingness to pay. Functional decomposition is an important topic in many 
engineering disciplines, but engineering representations are generally domain-specific. 
Design theory provides general representations but it is difficult to translate these into 
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In economics, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) developed a theory of complementarity based 
on  the  mathematical  concept  of  “supermodularity”  (Topkis,  1998).
19 Some  value 
functions  fit  nicely  in  this  framework,  but  others  do  not.  Another  approach  is  the 
construction  of  so-called  NK  value  landscapes,  but  these  are  randomly  generated 
structures,  and  have  not  to  this  point  proved  capable  of  representing  real  systems 
(Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Ethiraj, 
Levinthal and Roy, 2007). 
What is needed, I believe, is a representation that is powerful enough to capture 
the existence, location and nature of bottlenecks in real technical systems, but simple 
enough to support direct intuition and reasoning. Goldratt’s (1990) theory of constraints 
is one possible starting point. Another possible starting point is Arthur’s (2009) theory of 
technologies as hierarchies of interacting methods, each of which solves a problem and 
thus contributes to the value of the whole. This approach echoes earlier work on industry 
evolution  and  dominant  designs  by  Tushman  and  Rosenkopf  (1992),  Tushman  and 
Murmann (1998), and Murmann and Frenken (2006). 
Five  decades  ago,  the  economy  contained  many  separate  and  incompatible 
technical  systems,  managed  independently  by  different  firms.  Today,  through  the 
evolution of digital technology, we are advancing towards a world comprising one large 
technical system with many interoperating and evolving parts. Architectural knowledge 
provides  a  way  of  understanding  large  technical  systems  and  dividing  them  up  into 
coherent units of analysis. Dynamic architectural capabilities provide a comprehensive 
                                                 
19 “Supermodularity” is a functional property of components wherein increasing contributions from one  
increases the positive impact of another. It is not related to modularity, which is a structural property of 
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framework in which to manage bottlenecks, modular structure, organization boundaries 
and property rights in pursuit of value and competitive advantage. 
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